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Three essays in industrial organization.

Boston University.

Three essays in industrial organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : 單行本
正題名/作者:	Three essays in industrial organization./
作者:	Mehta, Aditi.
面頁冊數:	131 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-01, Section: A, page: 0307.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International69-01A.
標題:	Gerontology. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoeng/servlet/advanced?query=3296025
ISBN:	9780549412793

Three essays in industrial organization.
Mehta, Aditi.

Three essays in industrial organization. - 131 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-01, Section: A, page: 0307.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2008.

This dissertation is made up of three essays in industrial organization. The first chapter is titled "Spatial Competition and Market Definition in the Nursing Home Industry." The degree of competition in the nursing home industry has profound implications for regulations, quality and pricing decisions. This chapter presents a model of spatial competition in the nursing home industry to investigate how consumer preferences over location can affect the substitutability and the degree of competition between geographically differentiated nursing homes. The estimates on distance and price show plausible substitution effects and time costs. Simulation results reveal a higher own price elasticity of demand than found in the previous literature. The model is used to examine the impact of changes in the market structure of nursing homes in one hypothetical county.

ISBN: 9780549412793Subjects--Topical Terms:

168436
Gerontology.

Three essays in industrial organization.
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500 $a Adviser: Randall P. Ellis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2008.
520 $a This dissertation is made up of three essays in industrial organization. The first chapter is titled "Spatial Competition and Market Definition in the Nursing Home Industry." The degree of competition in the nursing home industry has profound implications for regulations, quality and pricing decisions. This chapter presents a model of spatial competition in the nursing home industry to investigate how consumer preferences over location can affect the substitutability and the degree of competition between geographically differentiated nursing homes. The estimates on distance and price show plausible substitution effects and time costs. Simulation results reveal a higher own price elasticity of demand than found in the previous literature. The model is used to examine the impact of changes in the market structure of nursing homes in one hypothetical county.
520 $a The second chapter, "Identifying the Age Profile of Patent Citations," proposes a non-parametric identification strategy to separately identify the effects of the birth year, citation year, and "age" of a patent using the lag between application and grant as a source of exogenous variation. We provide statistical evidence to support our assumption that the "citation clock" should not start ticking until a patent actually issues, and we examine the potential bias introduced by our method if the lag between application and grant is correlated with citation levels. Finally, we use our proposed identification strategy to re-examine some prior results on the citation age profile of patents from different technological fields.
520 $a The third chapter, "Pay-for-Performance in the Nursing Home Industry," uses a model of duopoly to investigate the effects of pay-for-performance mechanisms on nursing home quality. Previous literature has supposed that different type of mechanisms will only give a limited subset firms an incentive to increase quality. I show that each mechanism can lead to an increase in quality for both top and bottom quality firms. In addition I compare the two types of mechanisms. I investigate the market conditions under which each mechanism will lead to a higher increase in average quality and consumer welfare given the same increase in Medicaid spending. I find that when the lower quality firm is less efficient, the starting reimbursement rate is higher and there is a smaller increase in the Medicaid budget, the competitive pay-for-performance mechanism performs better.
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